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"UPROAR IN THE ECHO": 
BROWNING'S VITALIST BEGINNINGS 
By Leslie White 
In letters to Mrs. Ernest Benzon and Mrs. Thomas FitzGerald, 
Browning claims affinity with the great philosopher of the Will, 
Schopenhauer, and asserts that elements of vitalism are the "sub 
stratum" of his life and work. These letters confirm the poet's place 
in the line of vitalist thought shaped by Schopenhauer, the English 
Romantics, and Carlyle and further developed by Nietzsche, 
George Bernard Shaw, Henri Bergson, and D.H. Lawrence. Vital 
ism resists precise definition; each theorist advances a singular 
terminology and application. Schopenhauer's vitalism may be un 
derstood from his concept of cosmic Will; Carlyle's from the essen 
tial presence of energy, movement, and change in the world. 
Bergson used the term ?lan vital and Lawrence such characteristi 
cally vague phrases as "sense of truth" and "supreme impulse" to 
express faith in forces operating beneath or hovering above the 
surface of life. Broadly put, when a rational orientation to the 
world ceased to be adequate, when rationalism devolved into a 
falsification of reality's authentic energy, major vitalists came into 
existence and posited as the true reality a primitive, universal force 
of which everything in that reality is an objectification. Unlike 
other vitalists in the English tradition, such as Blake and Lawrence, 
Browning was not comfortable with cosmic images. His vitalism 
breaks from the main line to focus on the individual human will, 
which he saw as an intuitive impulse and as a means to realize the 
self and locate its place in the world. For Browning, the com 
prehension of life's vital movement lay in the dynamic energy of 
willed action. 
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During the first year of their correspondence, Browning received 
Helen Zimmern's biography of Schopenhauer from Mrs. Fitz 
Gerald; after he delayed looking into it for some six weeks, he read 
with such "satisfaction that - a very unusual circumstance 
- 
[he] at 
once turned back to the beginning and proceeded to the end a 
second time" (Browning, Letter to Benzon). Although the poet 
admitted having had "no great interest in what the name 
[Schopenhauer] might represent" and acknowledged that "Scho 
penhauer had been hitherto a mere name to me," Zimmern's biog 
raphy seems at least to have entertained Browning, even stirred 
something in him. That Browning had not read Schopenhauer and 
apparently was unfamiliar with his "grand discovery" before 1876 
is somewhat surprising, especially when we consider the poet's 
interest in German literature and philosophy. More odd than 
Browning's unfamiliarity with Schopenhauer is the fact that he 
seems to have had only superficial knowledge of other more famous 
German philosophers. In 1882, during a meeting of the Browning 
Society, the poet would declare, perhaps truthfully, perhaps simply 
to quell bothersome questions, "Once for all, I have never read a 
line, original or translated, by Kant, Schelling, or Hegel in my 
whole life" (Irvine and Honan 502). 
Though unfamiliar with Schopenhauer before 1876, Browning 
nevertheless could write confidently in both letters about striking 
similarities between the philosopher's "grand discovery" and his 
own vitalist ontology: 
I gain an adequate notion of Schopenhauer and what he accounts his grand 
discovery. So much of it as I acknowledge for truth as I have believed in from 
my earliest youth 
. . . the distinction and pre-eminence of the Soul from and 
over the Intelligence 
- 
"Soul" in the evident sense of Schopenhauer's "Will" 
- And the fact was at once so realized by me, that I am sure it must show 
through my writings, here and there, as their substratum. (Browning, 
Letter to Benzon) 
And from a second letter, written some two months later: 
What struck me so much in that Life of Schopenhauer which you gave me, 
was that doctrine which he considered his grand discovery 
- and which / had 
been persuaded of from my boyhood 
- and have based my whole life upon: 
- that the soul is above and behind the intellect which is merely its servant. 
. 
. . The consequences of this doctrine were so momentous to me 
. . . that I am sure there must be references to and deductions from it 
throughout the whole of my works. 
. . . (McAleer 34-35) 
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Browning's remarks are bold and striking, but since he claims that 
he had barely heard of Schopenhauer before 1876, we need not 
address the question of direct influence. Yet Browning's insistence 
that the doctrine in question was "so momentous" to him demands 
that we look closely at his comments. How is Browning defining 
"Soul" here? What is it to claim that the "Soul" is "above and 
behind the intellect" ? And should we regard Browning's identifica 
tion ?f "Soul" with Schopenhauer's "Will" as a daring equation or 
as a fundamental misunderstanding of Schopenhauer? We should 
begin by defining the Schopenhauerian "grand discovery" (if in 
deed it was Schopenhauer's) that Browning "based [his] whole life 
upon" and that exists as the "substratum" of his writings. 
We may gain an adequate notion of the character of Die Welt als 
Wille und Vorstellung by focusing on its central concept of Will 
- a 
blind, striving, pervasive force and, for Schopenhauer, the essence 
of reality itself. Schopenhauer maintains that man acts according to 
the prompting of this cosmic Will, a naturalistic force, and not 
according to any intellectual system. "This Will," he writes, "and 
this alone gives man the key to his own existence, reveals to him the 
significance, shows him the inner mechanism of his being, of his 
actions, of his movements" (Schopenhauer 130). Yet for 
Schopenhauer, the Will is doomed to privation; it strives because it 
is unfulfilled. Where it does find fulfillment, that fulfillment turns 
out to be illusion, and the human will itself alternates between 
suffering and boredom. Browning's equation of the power of the 
Soul with Schopenhauer's Will is certainly ambiguous but finally 
not problematic as we see when we explore the poet's beginnings 
as a vitalist poet. He uses both terms frequently, interchangeably, 
and so variously that it is unnecessary if not impossible to reach an 
encompassing definition of either. "Soul," "Will," "principle of 
restlessness," "impulse," "tendency," "desire"-all convey Brown 
ing's faith in intuition. 
It is highly possible that Browning got his ideas on the will and 
vitalism from Schopenhauer indirectly, either on the strength of his 
attachment to the Romantics, or to Carlyle, or as they were made 
available to him as part of the intellectual/cultural discourse of the 
30s and 40s. The sources of Browning's vitalism are, however, less 
significant than the fact of its presence and its place in his thought 
and poetic development. Essentially Browning takes the energy 
and a bit of the mystery of a Schopenhauerian Will and humanizes 
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it, examining the faculty as "an effective power for realizing our 
selves and for consummating our relationship with the world" 
(Cooke 14). The individuality of the self as a precise, unique man 
ifestation of the Universal Will that one finds central to vitalist 
thought reminds us of Browning's stress on "incidents in the de 
velopment of the soul" (Jack 156); exploring this development 
would remain throughout his career his only concern. 
A version of this cosmic Will of Schopenhauer's is in back of 
Browning's taut psychological realism. For Browning, each of us 
is an objectification of some prevailing power, which, as it moves 
through the individual human will, invests it with the impulse to 
"become." In this transference, the human will itself can become 
purposive and takes "the form of the will-to-individuality, to iden 
tity, to self-hood" (Peckham 149). This is Browning's vitalism: its 
character is bound up in the purposive striving of the individual 
will; its value lies in the ability to overcome any sort of determinis 
tic Will or causal Necessity, or the constraints and hypocrisies of 
the complex civilization that was coming into being. In this connec 
tion, I would argue that Browning's most characteristic writings 
are a record of the individual human will and of all that stifled it and 
of all that might fulfill it. When we look to determine the funda 
mental character and form that Browning's vitalism takes, which 
necessarily involve an articulation of his theory of the will, we need 
not go further than the long poems of the 1830s- Pauline, Paracelsus, 
and Sordello. 
This early poetry is a poetry of personal rebellion and of longing 
for transcendence that diffuses, that loses control even of itself. 
Finding subjectivism destructive, the poet seeks annihilation of 
self-consciousness by immersion in it 
? a paradox of Romanticism 
that can, on the one hand, power the most consequential literature 
and, on the other, exhaust talent with terrific speed. These poems 
declare that one must be in the constant process of creating oneself 
through some meaningful, radical action if one is to realize the 
soul's possibility and measure its dimension in a culture that often 
asks little and promises only safety. If this poetry ultimately fails as 
art, it manages to produce a brand of vitalism, defined in terms of 
an intuitive will, that seeks freedom from tradition, influence, the 
coercive power of audience. 
Pauline, Paracelsus, and Sordello possess an element of the de 
monic, that is, real life seeking a perverted form, misdirected vital 
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energy seemingly bent more on destruction than creation. David 
Shaw has identified the problem in Pauline as "the speaker's inabil 
ity to escape his own limited perspective. Instead of trying to 
understand other points of view, he identifies God, Pauline, and 
Shelley with himself" and mistakes "his own point of view for the 
total truth ..." (Shaw 13). The speaker's failure to shape a poetic 
experience and project it beyond the immediate subverts his artistic 
impulse and mires him in vague self-contemplation: 
Oh Pauline, I am ruined who believed 
That though my soul had floated from its sphere 
Of wild dominion into the dim orb 
Of self- that it was strong and free as ever! 
It has conformed itself to that dim orb. . . . 
(lines 89-93) 
Beneath the speaker's despair and regret, though, lies a kind of 
salvation, a relentless vitality that sustains him during his reckless 
movement through the poem. He is "made up of an intensest life" 
(268), and in the absence of poetic direction and artistic will relies 
on "a principle of restlessness / Which would be all, have, see, 
know, taste, feel, all" (277-78). From this "intensest life" of "pas 
sions, feelings, powers" (271) rises the steadfast imagination and 
with it the promise of locating form, subject, style; but the speaker 
is so overcome by the presence of this imaginative power that he is 
unsure how to channel it. If intellectually he does not understand 
his principal objective, somehow he intuits that he must transcend 
(and transform) the artistic limits he has inherited and learn some 
thing of their worth to him as a poet. 
Pauline is a poem of rough movement, its terrain a pattern of 
withdrawal and tenuous emergence that mirrors the speaker's alter 
nating mental states of bondage and escape, underscoring a fierce 
need to exceed his limitations, to rid his spirit of a debilitating 
egocentrism. By frequently pairing words and phrases such as 
"unchained," "unlocked," "darkness chained," "restraint," and 
"clay prison" with "chainless," "wandering," "set free," "ener 
gies," and "struggling aims," Browning reveals the speaker's di 
vided inner life, the poem's only landscape. The crucial passage in 
Pauline in this regard shows a dynamic soul quickened by an in 
exhaustible energy that seems ready to erupt into "some state of life 
unknown" (600): 
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I cannot chain my soul: it will not rest 
In its clay prison, this most narrow sphere: 
It has strange impulse, tendency, desire, 
Which nowise I account for nor explain, 
But cannot stifle, being bound to trust 
All feelings equally, to hear all sides : 
How can my life indulge them? 
. . . 
(593-99) 
Eager to confront the conflicts of this life, yet confused by and 
fearful of their consequences, the speaker, although obviously 
aware of the energy that moves through him, is unsure of either its 
source or the extent of its power. He knows only that this is a will 
to freedom and an escape from tyranny of considerable dimension, 
whether it be social, political, artistic, or personal. Browning him 
self would come to realize that this will is what is most distinctively 
human; he comes to feel that man's most profound motive is a 
religious urge to destroy the obsolete and the ineffectual and to 
create a new order. 
But at this point in the poem, the speaker laments his inability to 
force his energies toward "one end," this end being the splendor of 
an absolute, which he can only identify as a "hunger but for God" 
(821): 
I envy 
- how I envy him whose soul 
Turns its whole energies to some one end, 
To elevate an aim, pursue success 
However mean! So, my still baffled hope 
Seeks out abstractions. . . . 
(604-08) 
The speaker seems convinced that his very desire to be in the 
company of God will be redemptive, and despite his resolve to 
pursue this end, he remains suspicious of his method, sickened that 
he, finally, "cannot be immortal, taste all joy" (810). His yearning 
to apprehend a heightened truth, to attach his will to the Will of 
God - an essential if futile movement into the "outward" - has 
become by the end of the poem a need for survival so desperate that 
it lacks connection to any poetic lore or tradition. 
Pauline's speaker wants to take in all experience 
- 
and he seem 
ingly possesses the energy (though not the shaping will) to realize 
this desire. But this energy ultimately turns inward and spins off 
into labyrinthine confession. Paracelsus, on the other hand, has a 
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focused aim: he 
"aspire[s] to know (pt. 1.282), and the vast power 
of his soul that he unflinchingly directs toward this aim very nearly 
displaces its excessively idealistic character. Paracelsus' aspiration is 
immense, his belief in himself is so thoroughgoing that he dispenses 
with experience altogether or minimizes the significance of any 
single action. 
While each protagonist expects his apotheosis through identifica 
tion with God, the speaker in Pauline seeks God in the "lurking 
place" (7) of his own being 
- 
only to find that "God is gone / And 
some dark spirit sitteth in his seat" (471-72). He is shattered, fearful 
- 
quite in contrast to Paracelsus, who seeks more than God's pres 
ence. His one aim is nothing less than "to comprehend the works of 
God, / And God himself, and all God's intercourse / With the 
human mind ..." (pt. 1.533-35). To disregard "God's great com 
mission," Paracelsus initially believes, is to ignore "man's true 
purpose, path and fate" (pt. 1.277). Paracelsus views the Will of 
God as that divine entity to which man's will strives to attach itself, 
and at first his desire to outstrip all limits of mortal existence is 
checked by his reverence for the deity 
- a reverence which soon 
dissipates 
- 
and by his belief that he is incapable at this point of 
accomplishing such a feat. This reverence leads him "to submit / 
[His] plan, in lack of better, for pursuing / The path which God's 
will seems to authorize" (pt. 1.171-73), thus abrogating for the 
moment his own will-to-individuality. Below this thin overlay of 
supplication is a massive ambition, born of the fear of his own 
inadequacy and of possible divine rejection. Fearing failure, 
Paracelsus makes certain provisions, but he does so perfunctorily. 
If confronted with failure of any sort, he resolves to live "just as 
though no God there were" (pt. 1.188), a brave if impudent asser 
tion which imbues the human will with its own divinity and an 
nounces that he is ready to do whatever it takes to get what he 
wants. 
The alchemist's friend, Festus, reveals something of the potential 
of Paracelsus, as the latter sets out to make his own myth, to add 
what is singular about himself to the culture: 
. . . you prepared to task to the uttermost 
Your strength, in furtherance of a certain aim 
Which ? while it bore the name your rivals gave 
Their own most puny efforts 
- 
was so vast 
In scope that it included their best flights, 
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Combined them, and desired to gain one prize 
In place of many, 
- the secret of the world, 
Of man, and man's true purpose, path and fate. 
(pt. 1.270-77) 
But Paracelsus discovers that he cannot survive in the exalted world 
that he envisions and is nearly destroyed there, thus justifying the 
worth of the very reality he wishes to transcend. Because he is not 
alive to the risks involved, the victory he seeks would be performed 
rather than won, merely acted cut rather than fully experienced. 
His will-to-KNOW can be vital only if he is aware and accepting of 
the ultimate and necessary futility of such a quest as his. Only then, 
as Festus maintains, can the striving itself truly matter and not seem 
empty movement. 
At various points in the poem, Paracelsus seems to be aware that 
man's instinctual nature is to strive, but he is so bent on his divine 
objective that he loses sight of the worth of this striving. In one 
epiphanic moment, he fashions a brilliant metaphor for the enig 
matic power that flows through all things: 
What fairer seal 
Shall I require to my authentic mission 
Than this fierce energy? 
- this instinct striving 
Because its nature is to strive? ? enticed 
By the security of no broad course, 
Without the success forever in its eyes! 
How know I else such glorious fate my own, 
But in the restless irresistible force 
That works within me? Is it for human will 
To institute such impulses? 
- 
still less, 
To disregard their promptings! 
. . . 
Ask the geier-eagle why she stoops at once 
Into the vast and 
unexplored abyss, 
What full-grown power informs her from the first, 
Why she not marvels, strenuously beating 
The silent boundless regions of the sky! 
(pt. 1.333-43, 347-51) 
Here again he tries to account for his "restless, . . . / [distrustful, 
most perplexed" (pt. 1.506-7) nature : 
" 
[I] felt somehow / A mighty 
power was brooding, taking shape / Within me. . ." (pt. 1.509-11), 
and "I was endued / With comprehension and a steadfast will" (pt. 
1.546-47). Convinced that his own "steadfast will" will harness the 
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very "cravings" from which it was formed, Paracelsus is the victim 
of a deception that is the essence of his character. Yet he has taken 
human promise beyond its limits, to that point at which either 
creativity (here, self-realization) results or individual will is made 
obsolete, where there remains nothing left for which to strive 
- 
and 
no impetus if there were. 
If energy comes to dominate the will, this energy becomes "vile 
lusts" which 
"grow up and wind around a will / Till action [is] 
destroyed" (pt. 2.135-37). The more persistent his striving after 
absolute truth, the more kaleidoscopic this truth becomes; devas 
tated that "truth is just as far from [him] as ever" (pt. 3.502) and 
helpless to explain his failure, he cries out for the power that sus 
tained him as a young man: 
Give [me] but one hour of my first energy, 
Ofthat invincible faith, but only one! 
That I may cover with an eagle-glance 
The truths I have, and spy some certain way 
To mould them, and completing them, possess! 
(pt. 2.257-61) 
His only consolation, and it is a considerable one, proves to be a 
vision of the continuum of existence, an abiding faith in the evolu 
tion of humankind and the renovation of human spirit. Finally 
accepting that the world will survive his perception of it, Paracelsus 
believes that Man should, 
Desire to work his proper nature out, 
And ascertain his rank and final place, 
For these things tend still upward, progress is 
The law of life, man is not Man as yet. 
(pt. 5.740-43) 
Unable to focus their energies or to imagine an authentic quest, 
the speakers in Pauline and Paracelsus barely survive their poems. 
But because Sordello's plan is to become the prophet-poet, itself a 
lofty but specific aspiration, his will takes on an aliveness and an 
efficacy wanting in the other two protagonists. As a poet, Sordello 
wants to disrupt, to forge a new poetry, style a language for that 
poetry, create an audience and in doing so both define and transcend 
his culture and his subjectivism. Sordello gains victory in a singing 
tournament he chances upon as he arrives in Mantua. He then 
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imagines the heights he might attain and immediately becomes 
possessed of a will-to-perfection that proves his undoing as a poet. 
Pride, or perhaps a premonition of the boredom that often ac 
companies complete success, smothers Sordello's will to push him 
self and his audience beyond his and their expectations. From this 
point, he begins to perform his songs rather than create them 
afresh, and the audience is merely entertained. Sordello begins to 
sing from a distance, half-heartedly, allowing his audience to fabri 
cate its desire for his performance, a performance that is reduced to 
a 
mimicry of the audience's distorted expectations. Having refused 
to commit himself either to his art or to his followers, Sordello 
parodies his talent and nearly destroys his soul. Eventually, he 
begins to see himself as the misunderstood artist, but this view is 
only a rationalization for his lack of will to create; he consummates 
his own degradation by placing the blame for his failure on those 
who once adored him. 
Sordello leaves Mantua and returns to Goito, worn and empty, 
his humiliation unbearable. Now divided by his social respon 
sibilities and his desire to retain integrity as a poet, Sordello experi 
ences an internal struggle that is soul-destructive. In this moment 
of crisis, however, he is permitted an intimation of a new, perhaps 
redemptive direction. He develops the desire to lead his people 
- to 
"wreak ere night / Somehow my will upon it [his vision of philan 
thropy]" (bk. 3.214-15). Sordello intends his involvement with the 
citizenry to effect a reforming of his self-concept; but as with 
Paracelsus, this strategy reveals the self-deception at its center. If 
the development of his identity rests on the validity and sincerity of 
his plan of reformation, then his scheme is only a new angle on an 
old objective. 
Sordello's is an ill-formed humanism; his objective is to aid his 
"disciples," to provide them direction by willing their actions, and 
thus their existence, by shaping them to fit his revolutionary ideas: 
This phalanx, as of myriad points combined, 
Whereby he still had imaged the mankind 
His youth was passed in dreams of rivalling, 
His age 
- in plans to prove at least such thing 
Had been so dreamed, 
- 
which now he must impress 
With his own will, effect a happiness 
By theirs, 
- 
supply a body to his soul 
Thence, and become eventually whole 
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With them as he had hoped to be without 
- 
Made these the mankind he once raved about? 
[bk. 4.197-206) 
Eventually, Sordello becomes decisive but still has neither a sense 
of his limitations nor control over his authoritarian passion. A gulf 
exists between his view of himself and the reality of his "eagerness 
to rule," to "Impress his will on mankind" (bk. 4.275-76). Because 
he foolishly believes that his "Will / Owns all already. . . 
" 
(bk. 
3.175-76) Sordello becomes two selves. He is a fragmented soul 
precisely because his own selfish aims undermine his apparent 
desire to serve his fellows. When the will is made slave to any other 
faculty, when it is blocked from attaining its highest impulse, 
man's personality becomes twisted, his will often made obsolescent 
altogether. Like Paracelsus, Browning's other failed visionary in 
this first group of poems, Sordello is not alive to the deliberateness 
necessary to apprehend that power greater than his own. And like 
the speaker in Pauline, he gradually begins to lose any notion of 
uniting with some force outside himself, as he listens to Palma, 
who attempts to explain the awesome quality of the "One," an 
unattainable power and an essential impetus: 
"How dared I let expand the force 
Within me, till some out-soul, whose resource 
It grew for, should direct it? Every law 
Of life, its every fitness, every flaw, 
Must One determine whose corporeal shape 
Would be no other than the prime escape 
And revelation to me of a Will 
Orb-like o'ershrouded and inscrutable. ..." 
(bk. 3.319-26) 
Sordello's inability to assess the measure of his talent, his apparent 
willingness to throw away this gift, his condescension to his public, 
and then his need to dominate it suggest his paradoxical nature, his 
self-aggrandizement, underscoring his majestic failure. If one's 
soul develops through artistic creation and political involvement, 
then Sordello's soul has indeed developed. The poem itself is a 
study of the will as a potential agent of salvation, as an element of 
personality, and as the deepest self; it is also a study of the collapse 
ofthat will under the weight of internal and cultural pressures too 
great to bear. 
102 BROWNING INSTITUTE STUDIES 
Sordello wants greatness immediately, but he is unwilling to 
give the supreme effort to reach this ideal. He wanted to fashion the 
ideal state from his poetic vision, but he realizes that he cannot 
manufacture such a state, and even if he could he knows it would be 
disastrous to impose it on the unwilling. His seeming failure is not 
without nobility and poignancy. His will had, in large measure, 
remained dynamic. He has broken clear of the "gross flesh" (pt. 
1.730) that imprisoned Paracelsus and the "clay prison" that held 
the speaker in Pauline: 
God has conceded two sights to a man 
- 
One, of men's whole work, time's completed plan, 
The other, of the minute's work, man's first 
Step to the plan's completeness: what's dispersed 
Save hope ofthat supreme step which, descried 
Earliest, was meant still to remain untried 
Only to give you heart to take your own 
Step, and there stay, leaving the rest alone? 
Where is the vanity? Why count as one 
The first step, with the last step? What is gone 
Except Rome's a?ry magnificence, 
That last step you'd take first? 
- 
an evidence 
You were God: be man now! Let those glances fall! 
(bk. 5.85-97) 
The real way seemed made up of all the ways 
- 
Mood after mood of the one mind in him; 
Tokens of the existence, bright or dim, 
Of a transcendent all-embracing sense 
Demanding only outward influence, 
A soul, in Palma's phrases, above his soul, 
Power to 
uplift his power. 
. . . 
(bk. 6.36-42) 
These lines suggest just how far Browning had come in this early 
poetry and something of what the journey was worth; there is 
discovery here, invention, a sense of having broken through and 
likewise of having only begun. This poetry is significant in Brown 
ing's development as a vitalist poet in that it explores that segment 
of the Romantic tradition which emphasizes the relationship be 
tween the strange, dynamic force in which the poet believed and 
the workings of the human will which so fascinated him. Browning 
early held the conviction that life was vital in all its parts and that 
our nature to strive for wholeness is prompted by the evolutionary 
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principle of life itself. Although he recognized that man's role in 
this larger progress was insignificant in relativistic terms, he ex 
pressed more than just a casual interest in the notion that the unceas 
ing movement of life, from its lowest forms to its most glorious 
moments, is in some sense inseparable from man's own develop 
ment. Humankind is the supreme rational representative of this 
dynamism, but man is not fully confident that his evolution con 
tinues beyond earth's finiteness; nor is he sure of the extent of his 
evolutionary potential in the temporal world. 
In his best poetry following Sordello and through The Ring and the 
Book, Browning would work out Paracelsus' intimation that 
dynamism is the law of life. An enigmatic principle, it surfaces in 
man as the will - his mere impetus to act, his means of choosing, 
his desire to better his condition, his need for self-concept. Man is 
not always allowed unopposed movement or unobstructed release 
of his energy, but much of Browning's poetry operates on the 
belief that the potential for such freedom not only exists but must 
be sought relentlessly, even recklessly. Browning was most in 
terested in how his "men and women" went about making sense of 
their personal experience and how they strove to make this experi 
ence 
compatible with what was promising and dispiriting in larger 
currents of life. Individual will must be pitted against these larger 
forces if one is to measure the value of the life one has created and 
will continue to create for oneself. 
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